Presidential elections mark turning point

On 10 August, for the first time in its history, Turkey chose its president through direct elections and though the actual balloting might have been democratic, it was anything but fair. “Give me the most ordinary detergent on the market,” a friend in marketing told me. “Let me advertise it non-stop. Allow me to disparage my competitors without allowing them to market their own brands, let alone respond to my claims. Before you know it, my humdrum detergent will be the leading brand.” In analogous fashion, the sitting prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, had the advantage over his competitors, so it was no great surprise that he romped home with a win of nearly 52% in the first round. Erdoğan profited immeasurably from his use of state television and other media organs. Such opportunities were denied the other two candidates.

So while the final outcome may have been a foregone conclusion, it would be wrong to disregard the message which the electorate still managed to convey. We are witnessing nothing less than a fundamental shift in the way Turkish politics have been conducted for the past 12 years.   

First of all, the decrease in voter turnout – from 89% in the March 30^th local elections, down to 73% in this one – indicates that voters were less influenced by the ongoing political polarization in Turkey than many commentators suggest. That numerous voters from all walks of life, irrespective of political party, did not show up at the ballot box can be seen as a snub to Turkey’s bickering politicians, a cry of “A plague on both your houses!” The campaign was dominated by identity politics, not substantive issues, and the low rate of participation suggests that the electorate cannot be manipulated so easily.
Of course, the election was still an important victory. While Erdoğan might have had an unfair advantage, he still won. On the other hand, the margin of victory makes it almost impossible for him to realize his dream of creating a presidential system. This 52% includes large numbers of votes from followers of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and other right-wing parties, who have temporarily lent their support to Erdoğan.   The assumption must be that Erdoğan commands strong personal support and that a party deprived of his leadership will do less well.
 
Turkey is essentially a four-party system, which means that any individual party needs around 42% of the vote to establish a single-party government. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) received 43% of the vote in the March 30^th elections, in which all the parties worked hard to mobilize the vote. If this result is repeated in the general elections, which must be held within the next 10 months, it would give the AKP only a slim overall majority, not enough to change the Constitution. Moreover, the AKP will proceed towards the next elections (which will probably be held in June 2015) deprived for the first time of Erdoğan’s leadership and charisma.
 
After Erdoğan steps down as prime minister, a number of different scenarios might occur, including a power struggle, the emergence of different factions, or even the breakup of the party.  But come what may, Erdoğan and the AKP will still face a dilemma. The party needs a strong and convincing leader to impress the electorate, but too powerful a leader will frustrate Erdoğan’s ambitions to rule from the presidential office. Either the AKP will be headed by a strong leader who will try to turn Erdoğan into a ceremonial president, or it will have a “caretaker” prime minister at Erdoğan’s beck and call who will fail to impress the electorate. Erdoğan’s main post-election dilemma is to find a leader for the AKP who will both be loyal to him and be a vote-getter for the party. Erdoğan is unlikely to be an impartial president; rather, he can be expected to use political rallies and television broadcasts to support the AKP in the 2015 elections. However, this would undeniably set a dangerous precedent for Turkey and lead to a serious political crisis.

Without a doubt, the biggest losers in this election were the CHP and MHP, whose joint candidacy failed to find support. The CHP’s strategy of making inroads into the center-right did not succeed in the March local elections; nor did it succeed this time. Some social democratic, left-wing CHP voters did not give their support to the conservative-nationalist Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. Some did not vote at all, others voted for the only left-wing candidate in the election, Selahattin Demirtaş. The presidential election provided Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu with an opportunity to free the CHP from its quarrel between secularism and Islamism, and make it a real social democratic party mainly concerned with the problems of large segments of society. The CHP tried to get around this issue by supporting İhsanoğlu in the presidential election. However, as a right-wing candidate, İhsanoğlu had trouble winning over the traditional CHP electorate; conversely, as the CHP’s candidate, he was unable to receive the expected number of votes from right-wing voters.
 
For years, the CHP has ignored the Kurdish question, on the grounds that it would cost the party nationalist votes. The party’s tactic of partnering with more right-leaning parties, such as the MHP, however, cause problems with its own voter base. In addition, it will also induce right-wing voters, who have traditionally kept their distance from the CHP, to shun such alliances and drift towards the AKP.
 
The MHP and Devlet Bahçeli suffered an especially large defeat in this election. In the cities of Central Anatolia, where the MHP typically does well, a significant number of MHP supporters voted for Erdoğan. Bahçeli proved incapable of forming an alternative to the AKP – which has dominated the Turkish right for 12 years – or of delivering his own party more than its usual 10-15% share of the vote. In this election, the MHP once again demonstrated that it will never be able to constitute the focal point of the center-right under Bahçeli’s leadership. Unless there is a change in the MHP’s leadership and the party structure,, it is unclear if it can even retain its current share of the vote, let alone achieve a breakthrough.

Significant gains in the election were made by the leader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş. For the first time since the 1990s, the Kurdish political movement has had a real breakthrough, with its share of the vote rising from 6% to just below the 10% threshold a party needs to be eligible to qualify for seats in parliament. The BDP and HDP’s combined 2.9 million votes in the March 30^th elections increased to 4 million in this election, despite the lower overall turnout. This was chiefly the result of Demirtaş’s ability to address a much wider Left wing constituency than disaffected Kurdish voters.  Previously, the Kurdish political movement was overshadowed by the PKK leadership and its armed struggle. Now, for the first time, there is a chance that this movement will produce a political leader who will derive legitimacy from the ballot box and from the electorate. Under Demirtaş’s leadership, the HDP has made democratic strides by distancing itself from Kurdish nationalism and evolving into a party with a much greater appeal.

In a climate in which all the major print and television media support are compelled to support  Erdoğan, the key question is what the opposition parties can do to overcome the hegemony of the AKP. The only tactic, it would seem, is that which  political Islamist movements began to adopt in the 1980s: mobilizing a grassroots organiaation that will reach greater segments of the Turkish people.     
 

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