Liberalism versus Electoral Democracy in Turkey

In his 12 years of power, Erdogan managed to push aside almost all his enemies: the Kemalist military and civilian bureaucracy, the country’s old media barons, the secularist business elites of Istanbul, and now the Gulenists. As a result, the former prime minister and the newly-elected president has become a hegemonic force in Turkish politics. Today, it looks like the old type of Turkish authoritarianism where military-bureaucratic tutelage dominated the system is replaced by a new type of autocracy.  Unless he manages an impressive U-turn to reverse his autocratic style history will probably remember Erdogan as an agent of change who nevertheless failed to democratize and liberalize Turkish politics.  The democratic elections that the AKP keeps winning do not guarantee constitutional liberties. In that sense, Turkey offers a perfect case study as to why democracy should not be reduced to elections. This illiberal tale of Turkish democracy is also instructive for countries like Egypt where a democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood was toppled by the military because of its authoritarian tendencies. 

While democracies are often obsessed with elections, liberalism, in the classical western sense of the concept, is primarily about institutions that ensure constitutional liberties and the “rule of law.”  Institutions that protect individual rights and liberties against arbitrary state power are the bedrock of liberalism.   In short, liberalism protects individuals and minorities from the tyranny of the majority.  Without such institutions, electoral democracies can turn into illiberal machines that sanctify the ballot box and majority rule without paying much attention to freedoms.  Democracies can degenerate into populist systems where the “sovereignty of the nation” or the “will of the people” is glorified at the expense of individual rights.

 As Fareed Zakaria argues in his book on liberalism and democracies, it took centuries for constitutional liberties to emerge in the West. Again in the European and American context liberal constitutionalism preceded electoral democracy with universal suffrage.  
Most new democracies from Turkey to Thailand and Argentina to Hungary tend to be illiberal democracies. They lack institutions that create the legal infrastructure for the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary and protection of constitutional rights and liberties. The political system in such a context may still have all the trappings of a democracy: the ballot box functions, elections are held, and the majority is represented in the parliament. But individual rights and liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly or the rule of law based on an impartial judiciary and the independence of the media have little to do with the ballot box.  Limiting the arbitrary power of the state becomes almost impossible in a political culture that glorifies the nation and the state at the expense of individual liberties.

The legacy of social engineering

The glorification of the state is compounded in countries like Turkey or Tunisia, where the founding fathers engaged in top-down social engineering in the name of westernization and modernization.  As Ataturk in Turkey and Bourguiba in Tunisia pursued modernization, Islam and pious masses came to be seen as major obstacles to the civilizing mission of the state.  Once the secular foundations are built on grounds of social engineering, it becomes almost impossible to empower the individual against the state. Instead, the main objective becomes to empower and protect the modernizing state against its enemies.  Individual rights and liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of association are seen as potential tools against the secular republic and its cultural revolution.  The system, therefore, discourages liberalism and empowers and jealously protects the sovereignty of the state against individuals or civil society groups. When on top of these dynamics, the military assumes the role of guardianship the system becomes neither democratic nor liberal.
Today, although the AKP claims to be the most pro-democracy political party in the country, it is an understatement to say that its commitment to liberalism is questionable.  The social-democratic secularist opposition, on the other hand, pays lip service to liberalism but it’s commitment to democracy is highly questionable because of their ongoing distrust of pious masses. This is why Turkey’s small liberal democratic segment is squeezed between a government that believes in democracy but not liberalism and an opposition that wants to protect secularism often at the expense of the ballot box.

A patriarchal leader and culture

Shortly after his third consecutive electoral victory in 2011, the AKP had a unique chance to truly democratize and liberalize the country with a new constitution. Yet, the last couple of years have shown that the leadership style of Erdogan and the political culture and governmental structure of the country remains deeply patriarchal. The crackdown of protests last summer clearly illustrated the limits of freedoms and how protecting the state and public order trumps the protection of individual rights and liberties.  As a result the AKP has squandered a golden opportunity for a historic reconciliation between different segments of society.

As late as in 2012, Turkey was still hailed as a democratic model for Islamist contenders in Arab world. In the wake of the first free elections in Egypt and Tunisia, Muslim Brotherhood officials often expressed their admiration for this moderately Islamic party, under which Turkey improved its democratic standards, economic performance, and regional influence.   Today, this Turkish model is no more and the country is becoming increasingly authoritarian and unstable, under the same leader who once received so much adulation. Increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and the recent corruption scandals have exposed an ugly side of Turkey with an abundance of democratic deficits.  Coupled with loss of regional influence in the wake of the Syrian civil war, the positive image of a democratic, prosperous and influential country has been replaced by authoritarianism in domestic politics, cronyism and corruption in the economy and deadlock in foreign policy.

Yet, Erdogan is now the newly elected President and he remains popular among significant segments of Turkish society.  As a result, Turkey is witnessing growing political and social polarization while there remains very few checks and balances over his political hegemony.  This is what happens in illiberal democracies with no strong institutions such as an independent media as the main guarantor of freedom of speech.   Unlike what many have predicted, the once hailed Turkish democratic model is not coming to an end because of a clash between Islam and secularism. Instead, the real conflict is between electoral democracy and liberalism.

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