What’s next for Media Freedom in Turkey? (1)

A disaster for what was left of media freedom and liberal democracy in Turkey was averted on June 7th when the incumbent lost not only its parliamentary majority but also its relentless political momentum towards building a quasi-totalitarian system. Yet, we are not out of the woods yet. The defeat of the AKP is far from absolute. To the contrary, the party can still legitimately argue that it is by far the most popular force in Turkish politics, despite its 13 years in power.
Whether in coalition scenarios or in the wake of early elections, it is almost impossible to contemplate a situation where the AKP is no longer the main actor in Turkish politics. Under such circumstances, the systemic problems that have been stifling freedom of expression and media freedom in Turkey will remain in place.  Only the context is changing.
 
In order to analyze what to expect for media freedom in Turkey, one has to separate the contextual from the structural and systemic. The contextual dimension of what is wrong with media freedom in Turkey has to do with the fact that the AKP has emerged in the last few years as a hegemonic force engaged in state-sponsored propaganda at unprecedented levels.
 
A weakening of the AKP hegemony will alleviate some of the problems related to the monopolization of political and economic power. For instance, a dual structure of power in government, where the AKP will have to share political power with a coalition partner will inevitably create more competition at the top for state resources. A coalition government, in that sense, will have to create a more competitive framework of patronage where the AKP and Erdogan will no longer be able to exclusively dominate all networks of clientalism.
 
Depending on the coalition partner – especially if there is a grand coalition with the CHP– there will be a dualistic structure at the helm of the state. And this dualistic structure will create dynamics of competition.  News coverage and media analysis will have to at least partly reflect this competition and duality at the helm of the state.
 
During the 1990s, when Turkey was governed by weak coalition governments, owning a media outlet was a more lucrative business than it is today under AKP hegemony. Media companies could make use of weak coalition governments for their own benefit. Since political parties were much weaker than the AKP, they were often desperately competing for media support.  As a result, media barons established a system of journalism whose main function was to simultaneously serve their business interests and the political demands of partners in coalition governments.
 
Under the AKP, the monopolization of power has changed the system. The massive presence of a single-party AKP government, and Erdoğan's total intolerance for even the slightest critique, has emasculated the media barons of the old system and eliminated their leverage. A much more subservient and relatively less pluralistic media structure has emerged.  In short, the AKP has become the only game in town and managed to silence powerful dissenting voices in the mainstream media.
 
Now with the potential return to coalition dynamics, the context will be shifting from the monopolization of power to a more fragmented picture. Perhaps the most important contextual difference with the formation of a coalition government will be the weakening of the personalization of power that has been taking place in Turkey. As we have seen in the last couple of weeks, all the potential coalition partners of the AKP are asking President Erdogan to abide by the constitutional norms of a parliamentary system.  This new situation is bound to limit Erdogan’s ability to single-handedly dominate the political scene.  If nothing else, the emergence of a stronger opposition in Turkey in the wake of elections, should in theory open more political space in the media for more critical reporting about the AKP.
 
Finally, there are also new psychological dynamics at play. Given the relative weakness of the AKP in the wake of June 7th, there is now more uncertainty about the party’s immunity from corruption investigations. The perception that the AKP is invincible and protected by the ballot box is giving way to a more realistic understanding that elections have consequences. In that sense, the tide is turning and there is now more room for whistleblowers. These new psychological factors will sooner or later have an impact on those who maintained their silence for fear of retribution.  All these dynamics may create more space for the emergence for the flow of previously suppressed information. In short, with the changing context and configuration of political power, the AKP and Erdogan will probably have a harder time to suppress dissenting voices within the party. A potential return of Abdullah Gul to active politics may further accelerate the denouement.
 
Beyond these contextual elements, however, there are also fundamental problems related to media freedom that are much more systemic and structural. It will take much more than contextual changes to alter these deeply rooted dynamics. I will analyze these factors in my next column.