Turkey: A House Divided

As Turkey is going to the polls for the first time to elect a president, there is sense of unprecedented political and societal polarization in the country. Some may differ with that point on the grounds that Turkey has always been a very polarized country. It is certainly true that during the 1960s and 1970s ideological polarization between leftwing and rightwing movements produced serious political violence and anarchy in Turkish streets. Yet, the ideological polarization of those decades lacked the scale, scope and depth of today. This is mainly because the digital revolution has radically changed mass media and mass politics. There was no 24 hour news cycle in the 1970s, no internet, and no social media. A world of one TV channel had limited power to polarize the country at the mass level. Compare this with today as dozens of news channels, almost all of them driven by partisanship, ratings and sensationalism fail to provide fact-based analysis, objectivity, and often basic information. It should be no surprise that polarization becomes the norm when independent journalism is a rare commodity.

There is also another, perhaps even more important source of polarization today: identity politics. We are in a world where identity trumps ideology. It is no longer leftwing or rightwing ideology but the very core of who we are that separates us. A polarization based on Sunni versus Alevi, Turkish versus Kurdish, Islamist versus secularist identities fuels tribalism and communitarianism. These are primordial identities which make threat perceptions all the more existential.

The political and social polarization that ensues creates no balance or objectivity in the way people look at the current dynamics of the country. For instance, in the eyes of the increasingly powerful pro-government media, Turkey has never been more democratic, prosperous, influential and successful. Similarly, at the societal level, a significant segment of the AKP voters seem to worship Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They can find no wrong in his policies despite the accumulation of overwhelming evidence pointing at systemic corruption, authoritarianism and crony capitalism. On the other extreme is another pole, where the anti-government camp sees nothing but gloom and doom. Erdogan, in their eyes, is a corrupt dictator who is undoing the secular and democratic institutions of the Kemalist republic. They sincerely believe that the country has never hit such lows in terms of democratic, economic, and foreign policy standards.

As you can predict, both camps can't be right. If Turkey had a glimmer of independent journalism a more objective and balanced look would be able to place the country somewhere in the middle of these two poles. The place to start is to compare the current dynamics with the past. There is no denying that today's Turkey is in a post-Kemalist phase. Under the Kemalist elite and the guardianship of the military, Turkey was ruled by the tyranny of the minority. Today, however, the Anatolian periphery has moved to the political center. Anatolia's conservative and religious periphery has produced its own political elite and this new elite is in power. What is missing are effective institutional limitations on executive power that would strengthen the rule of law and constitutional rights and freedoms.

In the absence of effective checks and balances such as a powerful media and separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers, the Anatolian periphery's march to the center hardly amounts to pluralist democracy. Instead, what we are facing is one type of authoritarianism being replaced by another. The tyranny of the minority has been replaced by the tyranny of the majority. This is what Erdogan calls the national will. Simply put, he has no sense about how a pluralistic, democratic and liberal system differs from a populist and majoritarian semi-democracy. By ending the system of military tutelage and guardianship, Erdogan proved to be a formidable "agent of change". Yet, he has utterly failed in becoming an "agent of democratization". This is hardly surprising when the institutions of democracy are missing. Instead of demonizing the AKP or romanticizing a non-existing democratic past, we should therefore recognize the enduring patriarchal and illiberal political culture of the country. Turkey deserves to be in a better place and this is mainly why achieving European Union standards should remain the guiding principle and main criteria in judging the quality of democracy in the country.

Finally, there is the all-important Kurdish question, which will probably determine the future of Turkish democracy in the long run and Erdogan's political fortunes in the shorter term. It is hard to imagine how a country where liberal and democratic institutions have been revealed to be so weak will manage to find a democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict. Given ongoing talks with the government, the PKK and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have understandably bet their future on the AKP. This enhances Erdogan's chances in the presidential race. However, the Kurdish question is a double-edged sword for the AKP: Winning Kurdish votes amounts to losing Turkish nationalist ones, often to the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). For now, the Kurds prefer to remain silent in the face of growing signs of authoritarianism in Turkey. Only time will tell if they come to regret it. Let's hope Erdogan turns his polarizing electoral victory on Sunday into a real one by addressing Kurdish discontent in Turkey with a new sense of urgency. This will require a serious change of course from the current trend of creeping authoritarianism.

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